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Religious Capital and Religious 
Rewards: A Study in the 
Economics of Religious Life 
 
Summary: Religious life is studied by way suggested by the rational choice
theory and the religious capital theory. The basic contentions of the theory on
the nature of religious life having to do with an exchange upon a religious mar-
ket, by firms offering compensators and rewards, and consumers, is consi-
dered. In the empirical analysis, it was validated that the independent (religious
capital) and dependent (religious rewards of two types) were empirically sepa-
rate constructs. Cross-sectional analysis of survey data indicated a very strong 
association between religious capital and institutional and ritual experience
rewards within religious life, at a cross-cultural analysis, including Bosnian 
Muslims, Serbian Orthodox, Slovenian Catholics and US Protestants. The
association was confirmed as robust at regression inspection with religious
socialization. This extends further support for the empirical validity these novel
theories of religious life and extensions of economic analysis into religious life. 
Key words: Religious capital, Economics of religious life, Rational choice, 
Religious costs, Religious rewards. 






The social scientific study of religion has been traditionally dominated by the (1) 
compensation theory, regarding religion as a form of compensation for what one 
does not attain in empirical social life, e.g. Karl Marx, In his version the idea of relig-
ion's source in compensating for the goods humans do not achieve in an empirical 
context attains the form of alienation, see, Seth D. Kunin 2006, pp. 68-70). (2) Fur-
ther, religion was regarded as a latent but possibly decisive form of social integra-
tion, as well as a mechanism providing conformity in society, subjugation of the in-
dividual to societal needs (Emile Durkheim, see Kunin 2006, pp. 26-39). (3) An im-
portant strand of throught was the one regarding it as a form of imperfect cognition 
(Herbet Spencer, Eward B. Tylor, French Enlightenment materialists, see, Kunin 
2006, pp. 20-22). Although the last has often been disregarded as lacking in intellec-
tual finesse, it empirically retained validity even in recent times (Sergej Flere and 
Rudi Klanjšek 2009). (4) Finally, a potent stream of social science thought on relig-
ion came from the Freudians, who regarded religion as a projection of universal guilt 
within humans (see, Kunin 2006, pp. 53-61). In all these cases, religious life was not 
scrutinised from an economic mode of analysis.  
However, recently the study of religion in social science has been challenged 
by a new, ”economic” approach, extending economic analysis to this area of social  
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and psychological life. Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge begin their ground-
breaking work A Theory of Religion by putting forward a simple axiom: Humans 
seek what they perceive to be rewards and avoid what they perceive to be costs 
(1987, p. 27). The core of their argument is that the logic of the rationally motivated 
social actor can and should be applied also in the area of religion. In a similar man-
ner, Stark and Roger Finke argue that ”…religious behavior – to the degree that it 
occurs – is generally based on cost/benefit calculations and is therefore rational be-
havior in precisely the same sense that other human behavior is rational” (2000, p. 
56). 
One of the pillars of the rational choice explanation of religion goes back to 
Adam Smith. In the Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith put forward the idea that ab-
sence of state interference and regulation of religion would stimulate religious com-
petition, religious endeavour on the part of ”the teachers” and religiosity among the 
populace itself, as a consequence of these endevors and of competition (see Scott C. 
Peterson 2009, p. 185). Further, religion is not regarded as a public good by Smith, 
but rather as a commodity, as all others which are offered, sold and consumed. ”State 
salaries” bring about ”indolence” and laziness on the part of priests (quoted in Peter-
son 2009, p. 186). Finally, Smith held that church competition with the state for the 
highest authority brought about instability and should be done away with. There 
should be only one sovereign monopoly, ”civil government to protect the people”. 
Implicitly, Smith was also advancing the idea of religious liberty and religious toler-
ance.  
Rational choice explanations of religious behavior often referred to as the ”re-
ligious economies” theory, quite in line with Smith. One of the core claims of this 
theory is that religious groups can be analyzed as firms that exist in a ”religious 
economy”, which consists of a market of current and potential religious consumers 
and religious firms, enterprises attempting to meet the demand of the market (Stark 
and Finke 2000). The underlying theoretical assumptions are that individuals make 
rational religious choices (i.e., they choose options that maximize their benefits given 
their preferences, information, and constraints) and their religious preferences remain 
relatively constant over time, such that any changes in religious behavior must be a 
result of changes in the benefits or costs associated with the behavior (Stark and 
Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Finke 2000). On the macro-level, the theory assumes that 
demand (i.e., aggregate preferences) also remains relatively stable and therefore 
changes in religious consumption (i.e., religiosity) are a result of changes in the sup-
ply of religion, rather than changes in demand (Stark and Finke 2000).  
According to Heckathorn, an authority in the area, the rational choice of social 
life approach drew directly on neoclassical economic theory. It viewed a wide range 
of phenomena in market terms. For example, a marriage system can be viewed as a 
market for mates in which those with highly valued attributes have the greatest value 
in the marriage market. Similarly, a status system can be viewed as a market for ac-
cess to individuals with highly valued attributes. High status people gravitate toward 
one another, thereby defining the upper reaches of the stratification system… The 
emphasis on market models carried over ny J. Coleman into institutional design. The 
problem addressed was the diminishing portion of the gross domestic problem going  
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into single parent households. He proposed to create a micromarket in child care ser-
vices… one form of market failure – a failure of the marriage market to provide ade-
quately for the needs of the children – was to be resolved by creating a secondary 
market. (2005, p. 620.) Thus, rational choice is regarded as a theory applicable to all 
areas of social life. 
The rational choice theory of religion holds that the crux of religion is to be 
found in compensators. The pillars of Stark's original theory, exhibited in a deductive 
manner were: ”Compensators are postulation of reward according to explanations 
that are not readily sausceptible to unambiguous evaluation” (Stark and Bainbridge 
1987, p. 29); ”Compenastors are treated by humans as if they were rewards” (1987, 
p. 33); ”Religion refers to systems of general compensators based on supernatural 
assumptions”, (1987, p. 39) and ”Religious organizations are social enterprises 
whose primary purpose is to create, maintain and exchange supernaturally based 
general compensators” (1987, p. 42). 
But in his more recent work, Stark goes beyond, somewhat mellowing his 
original position. He defines religion as dealing with ”the supernatural, which refers 
to forces and entities outside and beyond nature, that can suspend, alter the laws of 
physics… In pursuit of rewards, humans will seek to utilize and manipulate the su-
pernatural” (Stark and Finke 2000, p. 90). However, this is not a concession to irra-
tionalism, as ”humans will not have recourse to a supernatural when a cheaper or 
more efficient alternative is known or available” (p. 120). It always remains within a 
conceptualization that humans exchange goods, on a market, with a view to maxima-
tion utility and rewards, and minimizing costs. But this comes about in direct human 
interaction, where various tastes for these commodities are articulated, although the 
demand for the supernatural is relatively constant, whereas the offer variates as to 
monopoly vs. free competition. Monopoly brings about laziness on the part of the 
religious firms, whereas competition brings about a vibrant religious life.   
This theory was developed in the United States and could be been considered 
to reflect the American multi-denominational situation and American ”denomina-
tionalism”, an attitude generally favorable of religion, but with a prevailing view of 
little importance as to which denomination one belongs to and with a positive atti-
tude towards the existence of multiple (mainly) Christian groups. The research on 
rational choice also was prevalently American. Laurie C. Stoll and Peterson recently 
tested one of the basic contentions of the theory, namely that churches in state of 
higher tension to the general society will grow more, producing more committed 
members, whereas the more adapted and ”mainiline” will decline (Stoll 2008; Peter-
son 2009). This has to do with the inner connection among religious group memebers 
being gratifying, in contrast to loose organizations, without many demands and 
strictness, and without much association among members. However, the releation-
ship is not a simple one (Jonathan P. Hill and Daniel Olson 2009). The inverse rela-
tionship between the market share of a certain religious group should also positively 
correlate with the commitments of its actors, the suppliers of giving financial support 
to one's religious organization, which should also be conceived as gratifying, bring-
ing about a sense of having done something having intrinsic religious value, being 
favored by God (Jared Peifer 2010). Variation in religiosity during the life course is  
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known to be significant and has been interpreted in line with the rational choice per-
spective (Michael E. McCullogh et al. 2005). Religious conversions (switching) are 
also a common phenomenon in the US, although universal, but less common in most 
environments. This phenomenon has also been illuminated from this perspective 
(Matthew T. Loveland 2003). Ritual practice, including its strictness, has also been 
studied and well integrated into the rational choice paradigm (Joseph O. Baker 2010). 
Strictness is conceived as a giving to one's religion, which is rewarded by other 
members acting in the same way (forming a tightly knit group within which members 
find needed social support), as well as with other-worldly rewards. On the same sub-
ject, differences between men and women are stressed by Jacobs, who found that 
”that in religious commitment an economy of love is operationalized in which the 
commodities of exchange are affection, approval, and intimacy. As such, the male 
religious hierarchy plays a significant role in the lives of female converts through 
control over the emotional rewards of religious commitment” (1984, p. 155). 
However, most of the empirical research in this area has focused on testing 
macro-level propositions regarding how the supply of religion in a religious economy 
affects rates of religious participation (e.g., church attendance, tithing, praying, read-
ing sacred texts, etc.) (e.g., Laurence R. Iannaccone 1991; Janet M. Box-
Steffensmeier 1992; Mark Chaves and David E. Cann 1992; Finke, Avery M. Guest, 
and Stark 1996; Stark and Finke 2000; see Chaves and Perry Gorski 2001). Consid-
erably less attention has been given to testing micro-level propositions derived from 
the theory even though they form the basis for the macro-level predictions (for recent 
exceptions see Miran Lavric and Flere 2010). In particular, Iannaccone (1984, 1990), 
extending Gary S. Becker’s (1964, 1981) formulations of human capital, provides the 
concept of religious capital to explain micro-level variations in religious participa-
tion, religious rewards, both of the this wordly and other wrodly nature. Thus, Ian-
naccone (1990) proposes that the more religious capital an individual has, the more 
satisfaction (i.e., increasing returns/benefits) she will derive from religious activities 
and as a result, she will increase her participation. Other analyses indicated a direct 
relationship between costs and religious rewards. E.g., Lavric and Flere operational-
ized readiness of individuals to undertaking certain activities or refrain from some 
hedonic ones, in the name of their respective religions, whereas rewards were termed 
in a posthumous context (Lavric and Flere 2010).  
Although most the rational choice theory induced research has been limited to 
the USA, the major macro-societal phenomenon that was possible to be explained by 
this theory is the mass change in religious affiliation and change within the remain-
ing dominant religion in Latin America. In recent decades, a major change has come 
about in Latin America, in the direction of the prevalance of charismatic, ”pneu-
macentric” religion putting the subject in direct relationship to the (Holy) Spirit or 
spirits. This change is associated with a sharp rise in Pentecostalism, as well as with 
a change within the Catholic Church (Catholic Charismatic Renewal) and with a re-
birth of African religion. All this has largely been in response to the ”arrogance” of 
the Catholic Church concerning the needs and preferences of the Latin American 
poor, who previously articulated their strivings in the form of the Theology of Lib-
eration, which was suppressed by the Vatican. The result was a turn in line with the  
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tastes and preferences of the Latin American poor, particularly women and the ill, 
where the believer is put in direct communication with the Spirit (Andrew R. 
Chesnust 2003, see also Henri Gooren 2010). Latin Americans opted for a religiosity 
in line with their wants, which was at variance with the previous monopolistic ”of-
fer”, now in the situation of religious liberty, which previously did not exist.  
The world wide growth of groups, such as the Mormons, Adventists and Jeho-
vah's Witnesses has also been put in the rational choice context, focuring on the this-
worldly ”utility” of such religious group membership (Ryan T. Cragun and Ronald 
Lawson 2010). 
Rational choice analysis has been expanded to the comprehension of the reli-
gious situation in other parts of the world, China being designated as a ”shortage 
economy”, in view of state suppression and limitation of religious activity (Fenggang 
Yang 2010), although religious marketing is under way, although caustiously 
(Graeme Lang and Lu Yunfeng 2004). 
At the macro level of analysis, East European Orthodox Europe has not been 
found as a competitive market place, in view of restrictive legislation in the area of 
religious organisation, also promoted by the Orthodox Churches themselves (Ani 
Sarkissian 2009). This does not contradict the rational choice theory, as it allows 
space for monopolies and quasi-monopolies (bringing about a downturn in religious 
consumption in the long run, in keeping with Smith's classical contentions), as well 
as religious conflict and tension (bringing about a conjectural rise in religiosity (Stark 
and Finke 2000).  
Of course, some authors insist on refining the theory. Thus, Carl L. Bankston 
III insists on the difference between dimenisons of rationality, particularly on the 
difference between individual and aggregate rationality (Bankston 2003). Colin 
Jerolmack and Douglas Porpora make a morefar reaching objection, claiming that 
rational choice, in its classical form rests on the supposition of egoism and further 
claiming it is inadequate in the explanation of religion, where the notion of epistemic 
rationality would be more appropriate (2004). However, their objection does not re-
late to every day religous action and behaviour, but only to feelings.  
 
1. The Strategy of This Study  
 
In this analysis, we conceived religious capital as the predictor, in keeping with Stark 
and Finke (2000), who assert it is ”the mastery of and attachment to one's religious 
culture” (2000, p. 120). Religious capital includes knowledge of one's religion, its 
teachings, rituals and usages, as well as its implementation in social networks and 
socializing, particularly those of a primary nature. Religious capital contains ”inputs 
to religious production are measurable and indeed are already routinely measured by 
researchers” (Iannaccone 1990, p. 343). Religious capital may be associated with, but 
should remain distinct from religious socialization (Lavric and Flere 2010, p. 229). It 
is supposed that this capital is an asset in religious life, which will bring about greater 
returns in the form of satisfaction with one's religious life, particularly with, both in 
the this worldly and the otherwordly context. In the former group religious service 
satisfaction is particularly important (Stark and Finke 2000, pp. 120-125).  
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The religious capital variant of the rational choice explanation predicts that 
just as one’s knowledge and skills—human capital—increase the quality of economic 
(or household) goods, so too does one’s religious knowledge, skills and religious 
networking increase the quality of religious activities and thereby the benefits one 
receives from participating. Thus, Iannaccone (1990) proposes that the more reli-
gious capital an individual has, the more satisfaction (i.e., increasing returns/benefits) 
he/she will derive from religious activities.  
However, although predicting religious activity from religious capital has been 
studied (Finke and Kevin D. Dougherty 2002; Paolo Braňas-Garza and Shoshana 
Neuman 2007), the critical construct of religious rewards has been lacking in study 
and empirical validation of. It is the latter construct which must be present to truly 
test the contention, whereas when testing participation as a dependent variable (de-




The study is cross-sectional, of a survey nature, but cross-cultural, cointaining sam-
ples of higher education student respodents: Bosnian Muslims, Serbian Orthodox, 
Slovenian Catholics and US Protestants. Only those indicating religious affiliation 




The study was based on a survey of university students in four different cultural set-
tings. Our respondents were undergraduate university students, primarily in the social 
sciences and humanities, from environments with predominant and traditional relig-
ions in the surrounding population: Maribor, Slovenia (N=470, Catholics represent 
94% of the religiously affiliated), Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (N=439, Mus-
lims represent 94% of the religiously affiliated), Niš, Serbia (N=427, Serbian Ortho-
dox represent 98% of the religiously affiliated) and Auburn, Alabama, USA (N=450, 
members of Protestant denominations represent 72% of the religiously affiliated) The 
mean age was 20.3 (S.D.=1.5), and in all samples the average age varied between 20 
and 21. In all samples females formed the majority and care was taken to include a 
sufficient number of males. The relative share of males varied from 34% in the Bos-
nia and Herzegovina sample to 46% in the Alabama sample.  
In this analysis only the affiliates of the mentioned religions were studied in 
the 4 environments, still enabling sound statistical analysis, well above the norm for 
small samples in each of the cases.   
 
2.2 Instrument and Procedure 
 
The instrument applied was a questionnaire containing varied items, concentrated on 
various measures of religiosity and its possible correlates. The filling out of the ques-
tionnaire was conducted in groups of 10 to 40 students under the supervision of re-
search team members and took about 40 minutes. It was carried out in Spring, 2005. 
The questionnaires were translated from English into the other languages and then 
back to English or (in the case of the two ex-Yugoslav republics with cognate lan-
guages) Slovenian, so that possible errors in translation were avoided.  
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2.3 Dependent Variable 
 
In line with Stark and Finke (2000), gains were considered as gainful, rewarding ex-
periences at religious services were measured by items: ”Religious service is diffi-
cult to understand vs. easy to understand”, ”Religious service is not well planned vs. 
is well planned”, ”Religious service is useless vs. useful”, ”Religious service is not 
comforting vs. comforting”, and ”Religious service is dull vs. interesting”. All items 
were pro-trait worded. The summation of these items in the form of the Religious 
Service Rewards Scale indicated a Cronbach reliability of 0.91.  
  
2.4 Independent Variables 
 
The independent variable of religious capital was composed of both social and per-
sonal religious capital, as conceptulized by Stark and Finke (2000). It contained 4 
statements, all pro-trait directed: ”I often talk about religious issues with my friends”, 
”Religious matters are often discussed in my family”, ”My knowledge about the 
teahings, stories and principles of my religion is very poor” and ”I have strong 
doubts about the teachings and principles of my religion”. All items were pro-trait 
directed. At reliability, these 4 items indicated a Cronbach Alpha of 0.74. 
For the sake of checking for the robustness of the association between the in-
dependent and the dependent variable, religious socialization is taken as a variable 
within regression analysis. Religious socialization was observed by the item ”During 
my childhood, religiosity permeated out family life”, again a pro-trait variable with a 
1-5 format. 
 
3. Results  
 
Initially, we tested whether religious rewards, the dependent variable and religious 
capital, the independent variable are not confounded and in fact elements of a uni-
form construct of religiosity. 
 
Table 1   Rotated Factor Matrix for Religious Rewards and Religious Capital  
 






RS Difficult to understand_ Easy to understand  0.721   
RS Not well planned_ Well planned  0.769   
RS Useless_ Useful  0.820   
RS Not comforting_ Comforting  0.792   
RS Dull_ Interesting  0.701  0.445 
Religious literature?    0.744 
My knowledge about the teachings, stories and principles of my religion is very poor.    0.491 
During my childhood, religiosity permeated in our family.    0.468 
I often talk about religious issues with my friends.    0.613 
 
Notes:  Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring; 
             Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization; 
             Values below 0.40 omitted.  
 
Source: Data and calculations by the author.   
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The principal factoring analysis with Varimax rotation indicated a 2 compo-
nent solution. Factor 1 amounted to 56% of the variance, whereas factor 2 amounted 
to 12%. The analysis demonstrated that the constructs are separate, with one slight 
spillover, but no outliers. It is validated that it is possible to observe the two con-
structs as separate, although that is not always done in literature, because the con-
structs theoretical separateness has been established.  
It now remains to demonstrate whether religious capital brings about religious 
gains in the form of rewards in the two areas of religious life observed. The associa-
tions between the independent and dependent variables have been analyzed per each 
of the confessional environments. See Table 2. 
  
Table 2   Association Between Religious Capital and Religious Rewards 
 
  Pearson's r 
Bosnian Muslims  0.512** 
Serbian Orthodox  0.512** 
Slovenian Catholics  0.465** 
US Protestants   0.538** 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: Data and calculations by the author.  
 
Our findings are fully in line with the expectation pursuing from the rational 
choice and religious capital theory. Truly, those who are more knowledgeable and 
acquainted with their religion, its teachings, immersed in religious networks, experi-
ence their collective attendance rituals within these institutions to a greater extent. In 
fact, there is no cross-cultural variation and the associations are not only fully sig-
nificant, but unusually high. 
We checked the robustness of the association by conducting a regression 
analysis, introducing religious socialization as the control variable, to see whether the 
association might not mask another influence, the one stemming from family sociali-
zation, generally known to be a potent factor in the formation of personality and of 
religiosity (Brian M. D’Onofrio et al. 1999; Vern L. Bengtson et al. 2009). 
 
Table 3   Regression Analysis for Satisfaction with Religious Service 
 
  Religious capital Beta  Religious socialization Beta R2 
Bosnian Muslims  0.476**  0.077  26.8% 
Serbian Orthodox  0.386**  0.250**  30.3% 
Slovenian Catholics  0.379**  0.175**  22.9% 
US Protestants   0.485**  0.109**  29.8% 
 
Note: ** Beta is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Source: Data and calculations by the author.  
 
In all cases, religious capital retains full significance in predicting religious 
rewards. Among Bosnian Muslims, where religious socialization was highest and 
high throughout the sample in magnitude, this variable was of little importance (there 
was little variation).  
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4. Conclusion and Limitations 
 
Our study has shown that it is possible and useful to study and measure religious 
capital and religious rewards by way of thisworldly ones, at a cross-cultural level. 
The two constructs were operationalized in a meaningful manner, so as to bypass any 
possible circularity in conceptualization. We did not narrow down the construct of 
religious capital to personal religious capital (religious knowledge), as suggested by 
Iannaccone (1990), as that did not prove to be so clearly separate from religious re-
wards at factor analysis. Our construct was in keeping with Stark and Finke (2000). 
Rewards have been conceptualized as gratifications from religious service, and not as 
mere participation, which has not been recognized in research with one exception 
(Lavric and Flere 2010). This kind of approach made it possible to test the assump-
tion of maximizing behavior not only at the level of religious organizations, but also 
at the level of the religious behavior of individual social actors.  
Religious socialization remained relevant in all environments in predicting re-
ligious rewards, satisfaction at collective ritual, eith one exception.  
Specifically, religious capital increases religious gains i.e. rewards, supporting 
the contention that religious capital may be observed as such, as a meaninful con-
struct in the analysis of religious life and as an extension of economic analysis, in 
line with Stark and Finke (2000). This lends some further support to the general idea 
of humans as rational actors in all spheres of activity.    
Our samples were student samples. Flere and Lavric have found that in cross-
cultural analysis student samples are a good, although not always perfect proxy for 
general population samples (2008). Thus there is a certain possibility of extending 
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